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imprisonment and judicial appointments. The final section shows that similar dynamics were at work in El Salvador and Venezuela, countries with higher violent crime rates, and discusses the broader implications of our findings.
Blame Avoidance and Policy Entrenchment in Weak Institutional Environments
The literature on public policy in weak institutional environments suggests that reforms are often unlikely to stick due to the short time horizons of actors and efforts by entrenched interests to undermine them. 19 A path-dependent dynamic develops in which actors become accustomed to instability, and thus invest little in new institutions and policies, making it easier to overturn them and replace them with others. 20 When policy entrenchment does occur, the literature suggests, one can usually attribute it to the existence-or intentional creation ofstrong beneficiary groups, strong inter-temporal agreements between interested parties, 21 or the consolidation of power by rule-writers. 22 Scholars of American political development highlight additional factors that encourage policy stability: low visibility to the general public, which allows the most immediate beneficiaries to exert considerable influence upon policy; 23 long program duration, which tends to inspire greater activism in support of policy continuation; 24 the degree to which actors make investments that depend upon the continuation of policies; 25 and concerns about incurring voter wrath when benefits are withdrawn. 26 Much of this literature, in other words, focuses on the organization of winners and losers from reform in policy areas characterized by important benefits for politically important interest groups-and visible, politically salient benefits for voters.
Many important policies, however, are instead characterized by more abstract and diffuse benefits: shielding the population from rare but harmful occurrences, such as violent crime or 6" " unsafe food or pharmaceuticals. As Ulrich Beck famously argued, citizens often blame politicians when they do not manage risks effectively-even when they are beyond their control. 27 "Our contribution here is to show that focusing on blame avoidance and risk aversion helps elucidate patterns of entrenchment in such policy areas. The probability of harmful incidents may be low, but when they do occur, they attract media attention and public opprobrium, which can cost an elected official, career bureaucrat, or judge his or her chances for career advancement-and in extreme cases, his or her job. This provides incentives not only to refrain from repealing but also to enforce policies that guard against such risks, especially where the public is concerned about them. Blame-avoiding behavior can therefore lead to policy entrenchment even in the absence of well-organized beneficiary groups. This mechanism has been neglected by the theoretical literature on the politics of public policy in weak institutional environments.
Security Policy in Weak Institutional Environments
To illustrate how blame avoidance helps explain the entrenchment of policies characterized by small risks of politically damaging events in weak institutional environments, we examine two related policy areas that have usually been treated separately in the literature:
criminal justice policies and police reform. In these policy areas, two types of institutions are pivotal and weak. Judiciaries are crucial for the implementation of criminal justice policy, but lack independence, while police forces are weak in the sense they often do not act in accordance with the law. We argue that blame avoidance contributes greatly to the stability and enforcement of punitive criminal justice policies by a weak judiciary. Politicians and judges' incentives to avoid paying the political costs of crime provide them with incentives to maintain and implement
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punitive incarceration policies. Blame avoidance, however, provides weaker incentives for the consolidation of police reform, even though reforms may reduce crime. This allows entrenched interests that stand to lose from police reform-such as the police hierarchy, as well as their political allies-to sabotage reform efforts.
The Entrenchment of Punitive Criminal Justice Policies
Americanist and comparative literatures alike have documented politicians' strong incentives to adopt punitive criminal justice policies, such as mandatory minimum sentences and restrictions on pre-trial release. Salient, heinous crimes-especially those committed by released prisoners-are rare, but when they occur, they can decisively hurt a politician's image and electoral chances. 28 The introduction of punitive policies is a "politically cheap" way for incumbents to present themselves as addressing the concerns of electorates worried about crime and to proactively avoid the risk of being blamed for crimes committed on one's watch. 29 Analyses of American crime policy also stress that once punitive policies are on the books, concerns regarding blame discourage politicians from repealing them. 30 One would expect such incentives to be more important in developing democracies, where voters routinely rank crime as one of their most pressing concerns. The 2011-2014 wave of the World Values Survey reports that respondents from fifty-one countries-thirty-five of which are democracies and hybrid regimes-rank crime among their top three concerns. Meanwhile, the 2013
Latinobarometer survey reports that 24% of respondents considered crime to be the main problem in their country, surpassing all other economic problems considered individually. Not surprisingly, in Latin America conservative and liberal politicians alike often incorporate crime 'regulation' initiatives into their platforms or employ them in response to security crises.
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Efforts to repeal punitive elements of the criminal code must overcome politicians' concerns to avoid appearing soft on crime. Recent history provides some examples of the rare political circumstances under which this can occur. First, the democratization process itself can spark efforts to improve due process guarantees for the accused, out of concern to ensure judicial systems produce fairer outcomes than authoritarian systems did. For example, during the 1990s, most Latin American countries shifted from an "inquisitorial" to an "accusatorial" system, thereby separating the role of judge and prosecutor. 32 However, politicians have reversed many progressive changes to the penal process code throughout Latin America. 33 Supreme Courtswhich tend to be more independent than lower courts-have in some cases issued progressive rulings forcing governments to make penal process codes less punitive. 34 Finally, strong fiscal pressures from ballooning prison costs can prompt legislators to support reforms. 35 As stressed previously, these prompts are rare and encounter substantial headwinds.
While the literature suggests that many policies go unenforced in weak institutional environments, blame avoidance provides strong incentives for the enforcement of punitive elements of the penal code. The relevant Americanist literature stresses that elected judges possess electoral incentives to issue harsh sentences to avoid appearing soft on crime. 36 We argue, however, that the mechanism is different in weak institutional environments, where judges are typically appointed and less independent. A desire to avoid blame for violent crimes committed on their watch encourages politicians to pressure judges to interpret guidelines regarding sentencing and the pre-trial release of prisoners conservatively. This pressure can take a number of forms. First, politicians can publicly blame judges that authorized a prisoner's release for crimes subsequently committed, humiliating them and their families. Their incentives to do so will be particularly strong for violent crimes. These attract intense media coverage, and
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thereby fuel general anxieties regarding crime. Second, politicians can initiate or support legal complaints regarding the professional conduct of judges who approved prisoner releases or absolved criminals. While such hearings rarely result in actual expulsion, they can trigger a judge's suspension with reduced pay and weaken his or her chances of promotion considerably.
They can also provide an opening for authorities to investigate other parts of a judge's record.
Taken together, these pressures encourage judges to rule more conservatively than they might otherwise. 37 Meanwhile, few powerful organized interests stand to lose from these policies in developing democracies and can mobilize to block implementation. Imprisoned individuals are usually poor, unorganized, and lack social support. In contexts with highly organized criminal actors, those who go to jail are mostly the ones on the bottom of the criminal hierarchy. 38 While some human rights organizations demand fair treatment for prisoners, they do not normally exert significant influence on security policy. Finally, judges' professional associations can be quite fragmented in the context of low judicial independence, given the ability of the executive and legislative branches to influence appointments and promotions. This weakens their ability to resist pressures to interpret sentencing guidelines conservatively. In sum, it is not necessary to have strong, organized groups champion these punitive criminal justice policies. They can result from politicians and judges supporting them as a way of avoiding blame for highly salient political failures.
The Repeated Erosion of Police Reform
Many developing democracies have launched police reform initiatives: i.e., reforms aiming to bring police forces under civilian control, thereby reducing rates of corruption and
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police brutality, as well as improving crime control. Reform programs have typically included organizational changes, such as placing civilian ministers rather than members of the police hierarchy in charge, creating commissions for legislative oversight, instituting procedures for government (rather than police) review of cases of corruption or abuse, and adopting provisions for decentralization and citizen participation. 39 While blame avoidance fuels the persistence and enforcement of punitive criminal justice policies, the blame avoidance logic is far weaker for police reform. Political incumbents certainly do not want to be seen as tolerating police corruption or excessive use of force, or even worse, police organization of criminal activity. 40 For these reasons, they often launch police reform programs following scandals arising from revelations of police corruption or human rights abuses to distance themselves from the police. 41 At the same time, citizens are ambivalent regarding police reform. While citizens are generally very concerned about crime, and thus supportive of reforms promising to improve police efficacy, they often sanction excessive use of force if they perceive it as reducing crime. Police corruption is of secondary concern. This makes citizens much more sympathetic when interest groups blame crime waves on police reform efforts themselves, faulting reformist politicians for "tying their hands." 42 In addition, unlike the case of criminal justice policies, many important and wellorganized interests stand to lose from police reform. Police forces may directly contest or subtly undermine the implementation of reforms in various ways. On the one hand, they can pay lip service to the introduced changes while continuing to use traditional practices. 43 On the other hand, police can actively resist reforms through strikes or illegal, even violent "lobbying"
techniques, 44 including the surveillance and intimidation of government officials, or deliberately staging crimes to increase public support for more "traditional" police intervention. Local
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politicians can also obstruct reform efforts launched by higher tiers of government when they profit from police corruption. Illicit rents are often non-negligible for the local politician's capacity to maintain his political machine and win internal partisan disputes. 45 Consequently, unlike the entrenchment observed in criminal justice policies, police reforms are more likely to follow a cycling dynamic. Politicians turn to reforms to diffuse security crises stemming from the police's inefficacy, corruption or criminal behavior. 46 However, organized interests undercut these reform efforts. 47 Security crises therefore surface again, prompting new reforms.
The combination of these two dynamics results in a sticky "perverse equilibrium" of high incarceration rates and unreformed police forces. Police forces deal with crime in traditional ways, brokering deals with major criminal actors while arresting (or killing) petty criminals.
These arrests saturate the judicial and penitentiary system. Failing to reform the police, politicians turn to punitive criminal justice policies to show that they are tough on crime.
Public Security Policy in the Province of Buenos Aires
Our analysis of security policy in Buenos Aires encompasses the period 1997-2012, which witnessed a series of major reform initiatives in criminal justice policy and police administration, and covers the consecutive administrations of four different Peronist Party governors. During this period, we observe two patterns in security politics in Buenos Aires province: the resilience and vigorous enforcement of a punitive criminal process code and the repeated erosion of police reform programs intended to reduce corruption and human rights violations. In both cases, politicians and judges wanted to avoid blame for "security failures," i.e.
high-profile crimes or incidents exposing the police's corruption or criminal activities. However,
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while politicians had clear incentives to maintain a punitive criminal code and judges to enforce it, blame avoidance did not provide such incentives for politicians and bureaucrats to defend and implement police reform. This allowed police forces and political actors who stood to lose from police reform to undermine new policies. Meanwhile, the clear losers under punitive criminal codes-accused individuals-were far less organized and powerful. As a result, criminal justice policies have remained punitive and been vigorously enforced, leading to dramatic increases in the prison population, while police reforms have failed to gain traction.
Entrenchment of Punitive Criminal Justice Policies
Our analysis of criminal justice policies in Buenos Aires focuses on the stickiness and enforcement of new laws changing province's penal process code, that have influenced how likely individuals are to be imprisoned, and for how long. While the province, like much of the region, moved from an inquisitorial to accusatorial system during the 1990s and introduced a number of alternatives to pre-trial detention in 1998, legislation thereafter weakened protections for the civil rights of detained individuals. We focus on reforms that altered the criteria determining pre-trial detention, since these have an important impact on incarceration rates 48 by saturating prisons and police stations with unconvicted individuals. 49 Politicians' introduction and non-repeal of restrictions on pre-trial detention, as well as judges' enforcement of these provisions instead of less draconian alternatives such as electronic monitoring, dominated this period (1997-2012) and became more pronounced over time.
All four provincial governors-Eduardo Duhalde, Carlos Ruckauf, Felipe Solá and Daniel Scioli-modified the provincial Penal Process Code, expanding the situations under which judges should keep a defendant in prison while awaiting trial. 50 These measures essentially rolled back provisions for pre-trial release provided for under a 1998 law.
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Duhalde had initially sponsored the progressive 1998 reform, he quickly backtracked, promoting a law broadening the circumstances under which pre-trial detention could be applied (Law Various data suggest that provincial criminal judges have actively enforced these provisions. 61 The proportion of mandatory rather than conditional sentences issued by penal judges increased from 40% to 61% between 1998 and 2009. 62 she was exiting a bank, killing her unborn child. The media provided extensive coverage of both incidents, and the judge approving release in the first case was almost impeached. 64 Overall, judges' recurrent imposition of pre-trial detention, along with the slowness of the judicial Argentina, where political intervention in judicial affairs is normal. 67 In Buenos Aires, even the province's Supreme Court judges-the highest judicial body of the province-are subject to job insecurity, though less so than in many other provinces. 68 Criminal court judges are no doubt subject to greater informal pressures.
In Buenos Aires, political actors concerned with avoiding blame for salient crimes, which can tap into and increase public concerns regarding crime, have influenced judges' decisions through three main avenues: public shaming, appointment and promotion processes, and
16" " impeachment proceedings. First, politicians can publicly lambast judges for authorizing pre-trial or early releases from custody. The press contains numerous examples. 69 Second, although the judicial appointment process contains protections against political interference, 70 judicial branch interviewees suggested politicians successfully lobby governors to appoint judges with whom they agree ideologically or with whom they have personal connections, even when the appointees are not the best candidates for the position. 71 As a result, judges who "received [their] position because of political pressure rather than personal merit are bound to be dependent" on the Executive, or at least more compliant. 72 To curry favor with mayors, governors can also stack the courts by creating decentralized prosecution offices and appointing judges to fill newlycreated positions. During Governor Scioli's first two years in office, for example, he appointed over 300 criminal court judges.
Politicians also influence judicial decisions by launching impeachment proceedings against judges who release individuals from pretrial detention who then commit violent crimes.
In Buenos Aires, the two most notorious cases were attempts to impeach judges Nicolas Schiavo and Rafael Sal-lari in 2008 and 2011, respectively. Given their lack of substantive evidence, these proceedings were unsuccessful. However, politicians such as the mayor of San Isidro, Gustavo Posse, and civil society organizations such as the Mothers of Pain 73 publicly denounced and insulted the judges. 74 In an interview with the authors, Sal-lari-who resigned after being reinstated-described the politicization his proceeding: 
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The prominent cases of Schiavo and Sal-lari subsequently emboldened many individuals, organizations, and politicians to initiate proceedings against other judges when they did not approve of their judgments. 76 Impeachment is painful to judges for many other reasons. Indicted judges are temporarily suspended and have 40% of their salary seized during the proceedings. Furthermore, judicial inquiries-even if they do not result in impeachment or removal-remain on judges' records, lowering their chances of promotion. Even though impeachment has not resulted in the removal of criminal court judges, several have resigned prior to the beginning of the trial, 77 in part because opening such investigations grants the executive and judiciary the opportunity to investigate all of a judge's actions. Finally, even if a judge is reinstated, he or she is likely to rule more conservatively to avoid future inquiries. 78 Commenting on why he decided to quit the provincial judicial system even after charges against him were dropped, Judge Sal-lari stated:
"I have two daughters and everybody knows [they] are the daughters of a judge.
[…] I didn't want to get in a position where, if tomorrow I have to decide something that I know is fair, to have to back down because of fear of being prosecuted or that people insult me on the radio and have my daughters find out." 79 These pressures prompted discontented judges to create a provincial Network of Criminal Court judges. 80 This collegiate organization has issued several public statements denouncing impeachment processes as "persistent pressures and threats" against judges so that they do not "decide against the wishes of the [political] leadership," 81 and arguing that these pressures are especially common when "certain political sectors seek to capitalize on social demands for security." 82 In light of these pressures, judges have strong incentives to apply harsh rulings regarding pretrial detentions. Favarotto, who interviewed more than 40 criminal court judges,
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reports that many judges 'play for the crowd', sending individuals to prisons they know are uninhabitable and undermining their rights and guarantees to please society and politicians. Importantly, these restrictions on pre-trial release in Buenos Aires have been adopted, maintained, and enforced in the absence of strong beneficiary groups. Private companies do not manage the prisons, and thus do not profit from punitive policies increasing prison populations.
Prison guards are non-unionized, work under extremely poor conditions-sometimes doing 24-hour shifts-and are subject to physical and psychological abuse by inmates. While additional prisoners imply an extra source of income for guards who demand bribes from inmates in exchange for protection or personal benefits, overcrowded prisons are also more difficult to manage.
In summary, provincial politicians have faced strong incentives to maintain "law and order" policies, and judges have had career and personal reasons to enforce these policies to avoid having politicians shift blame onto them. Blame avoidance, in other words, has fueled the
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entrenchment of punitive criminal justice policies in the province of Buenos Aires, and thereby contributed greatly to rising incarceration rates.
The Cycling of Police Reforms
While Buenos Aires' penal process code has become increasingly punitive since the late 1990s, police reforms display a cyclical pattern: adopted by one governor, they are soon eroded by him or his successor, particularly those provisions providing for civilian control over the police establishment (Table 1) . 85 Politicians Secretary from 1994 to 1996, said: "the security minister is always the first fuse, even more than the chief of police." 87 However, incentives to sustain and enforce police reforms are weaker than with criminal justice policies. Police reform does not necessarily reduce crime and is politically costly to implement. In addition, the main losers under reform-the police-are organized, have strong political allies and can use several tactics to counter these reforms. 
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Carlos Ruckauf
Aldo In April 1998, Governor Duhalde appointed León Arslanián as Security Minister, who implemented a broad organizational and functional reform of the police, placing the force and each of its divisions under a civilian head, and creating neighborhood, municipal and departmental security forums for citizen participation. 92 He also fired more"than 3000 police
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officers, who then organized the 'sin gorra' (without hats) movement in protest. Arslanián also faced resistance from local politicians "who did not buy my ideas […] some believed that we had to negotiate with the police, this was a generalized notion among Peronists". 93 He left office in August 1999, after the Peronist candidate for governor, Ruckauf, made it clear that if he won he would dismantle the reforms. 94 Upon winning the election, Ruckauf kept his word, reinstating the police chief as the head of the security bureaucracy, sponsoring legislation that increased the police's discretion in arresting and interrogating individuals, offering police a bonus equivalent to six months of pay for using lethal force against suspects "caught in the act," and dismantling forums for citizen participation. 95 Governor Solá presided over two reforms, both of which were ultimately eroded. First, in abuses. 102 Other aspects of the reform, such as community policing, formally remained in place but the provincial government largely neglected them in practice. 103 Despite its previous support for police reform, the national government-now under President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner-did not block counter-reform.
In sum, multiple police reforms have been formally repealed or eroded through foot dragging, pressures from political allies, or violent lobbying. Politicians' interests in avoiding blame was not sufficient to prevent the erosion of these reforms. The situation in Buenos Aires province constitutes a self-reinforcing 'perverse equilibrium' of entrenched, punitive criminal
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justice policies and unreformed police forces. On the one hand, unreformed provincial police forces primarily arrest low rank, petty criminals, who -because of judges' enforcement of punitive elements of the criminal code-fill up the provincial prisons. According to CELS, by the end of 2010 provincial jails were overcrowded by 46%. On the other hand, the saturation of the prison system does nothing to solve the deep-rooted security problems in the province, which fuel public demand for more security. Such security concerns make it unattractive for provincial executives to defend police reforms, despite the evident need to do so. To address voter concerns about crime, provincial governors have instead resorted to punitive policies, which are more visible and politically cheap. Since the late 1990s, restrictions on pre-trial release and tough mandatory sentencing guidelines have remained on the books, while judges have enforced them vigorously to avoid blame for crimes committed on their watch.
Conclusion
Existing scholarship stresses that public policies in weak institutional environments are often unstable or not fully enforced. When policies persist and are implemented in such contexts, this is usually attributed to the existence of strong beneficiary groups, strong inter-temporal agreements between interested parties, or the consolidation of power by rule-writers. Our paper highlights an additional source of policy stability and enforcement in developing democracies with weak institutions: politicians' and appointed officials' incentives to avoid blame for rare, yet politically damaging events.
Politicians' focus on blame avoidance helps explain the simultaneous entrenchment of punitive criminal justice policies and instability of police reforms in developing democracies with weak institutions. Politicians have electoral incentives to avoid blame for graphic crimes,
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which tap into and augment general, underlying concerns about security. This leads them to promote and refrain from repealing punitive criminal justice policies initially adopted in the wake of security crises. Appointed judges, in turn, possess reputational and career incentives to enforce these policies because of their de facto tenure insecurity. Moreover, the absence of strong interest groups that stand to lose from these policies makes implementation straightforward. On the other hand, blame avoidance provides weaker incentives for the consolidation of police reforms, where the presence of strong, organized potential losers from reforms undermines them. Our analysis of the case of public security in the province of Buenos Aires illustrates the utility of this framework. The combination of stable restrictions on pre-trial release of prisoners and cyclical police reform efforts has generated a "perverse equilibrium" in the province, whereby security problems persist, and crime remains a main concern for voters.
This prompts politicians to promote additional punitive policies and gives police and their allies political space to undermine police reform.
Importantly, one observes similar dynamics in countries with higher rates of violent crime and varying levels of judicial independence. While El Salvador and Venezuela both moved from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial trial system and provided for a number of alternatives to pre-trial detention in 1998, the penal process code has maintained a punitive character. In both countries, legislators subsequently introduced new restrictions on pre-trial detention. 104 The fact that in El Salvador incarceration rates continued to increase, and in Venezuela rates of pre-trial detention quickly returned to pre-reform levels, suggests that, as in Buenos Aires, judges faced strong incentives to follow new, more punitive sentencing guidelines. This is unsurprising given that judges do not enjoy independence in either case. In Venezuela, judges are removed frequently, and thus hesitate to rule against the government or make decisions suggesting they
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are soft on crime. 105 And in El Salvador-generally considered to have a somewhat more independent judiciary than Argentina-it is not uncommon to remove criminal court judges, and the president has stated publicly that he could not tolerate "judges who let rapists and kidnappers out on the streets". 106 In other words, blame avoidance underpins the stability of punitive criminal justice policies in these countries as well.
Meanwhile, politicians and police have blocked or reversed police reform in both cases, in spite of public concerns regarding crime. El Salvador launched a major restructuring of its police following the end of the civil war in 1992 focused on demilitarization, establishment of civilian leadership, external supervision and training in community policing. 107 However, "political elites used violence to resist changes in the public security system" 108 and blocked the transition to a more professional and transparent police, downplaying citizen participation and ignoring human rights abuses. 109 Venezuela also attempted to reform its police in 2006 after the killing of three middle class teenagers. 110 The reform established a new centralized police force, as well as internal and external supervision mechanisms, including civilian police oversight committees. While many of these formal changes remain, many criticize the reform for not curbing police corruption or human rights abuses.
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This study is an initial, and hence incomplete, effort to understand the mechanisms perpetuating a "perverse equilibrium" in security policy in countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and El Salvador. Future research is needed to understand the extent to which variation in criminal court judges' tenure security, crime rates, and citizen attitudes about crime, among other factors, influence the political logic we describe.
Nonetheless, our findings are of theoretical and practical importance. Theoretically, our study contributes to a new, but growing literature on the politics of public policy in weak 26" " institutional environments. Our insight-that blame avoidance can help explain the circumstances under which policies stick and are enforced in such contexts-suggests that this emerging literature should devote more importance to voter-driven mechanisms behind policy adoption, stability, and enforcement. In practical terms, our framework can potentially explain the simultaneous entrenchment of punitive criminal justice policies and weak police administrations in other developing democracies-a perverse equilibrium characterized by routine violations of citizen rights, persistently high rates of insecurity, and large public expenditures on prison systems.
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